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CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCLUDED CONFESSIONS:
APPLYING AMERICA’S LESSONS TO A
DEMOCRATIC IRAQ
JOSEPH T. THAI*
Torture and interrogation were synonymous under Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Iraq.1 Unfortunately, given the notorious prisoner abuse scandal at
Abu Ghraib,2 and continuing police practices reminiscent of the former
regime,3 those words likely will remain associated for some time in public
perception if not also in practice in Iraq.4 If the emerging democracy is to
advance the liberal principle of individual rights, as advocated by some of
Iraq’s emerging political and religious leaders,5 then it will need to reform
interrogation techniques and rehabilitate public perception about them. This
will no doubt be a difficult task, and one that is complicated by the country’s
pressing need for security against the insurgent violence that plagues it daily.6

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. A.B., Harvard College, 1995;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1998. Thanks to Randall Coyne, Huyen Pham, and Paul Thompson
for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and thanks to Andrew Peterson for his
able research assistance.
1. See, e.g., S. H. AMIN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF IRAQ 21-24 (1989); INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS, IRAQ AND THE RULE OF LAW 122 (1994); Jack Kelley, Iraqis Pour Out
Tales of Saddam’s Torture Chambers, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2003, available at http://www.
usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-04-13-saddam-secrets-usat_x.htm; Bill Neely, Inside
Saddam’s Torture Chamber, BBC NEWS, Apr. 9, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_
east/2930739.stm.
2. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004,
at 42, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fa_fact; Richard B. Schmitt,
Senators Quiz Gonzales on Torture Policy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at A1.
3. See, e.g., Hannah Allam, Iraqi Police Off to a Brutal Start, ST . PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
July 20, 2004, at 1A; Brian Knowlton, U.S.-Installed Government in Iraq Is Cited by U.S. for
Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2005, at A1; Gideon Long, Torture Still Routine in Iraqi
Jails, Jan. 24, 2005, at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20050125/ts_nm/
iraq_rights_dc.
4. Indeed, the prison abuse scandal has spawned a new negative association between the
brutality of interrogations under Saddam Hussein and that under the U.S. military at Abu
Ghraib. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti et al., Pressing Inmates for Intel, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 17, 2004, at 33.
5. See Noah Feldman, The Democratic Fatwa: Islam and Democracy in the Realm of
Constitutional Politics, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
6. See Ellen Knickmeyer, Insurgent Violence Escalates in Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
2005, at A1; Jonathan S. Landay, Iraq Tops World in Terror Attacks, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 27,
2005, at A20; Dana Priest, Iraq New Terror Breeding Ground; War Created Haven, CIA
Advisers Report, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at A01.
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The task of reforming interrogation practices and rehabilitating their public
perception will require action on many fronts — military, political, cultural,
religious, and legal. Agreeing with Professor Noah Feldman’s observation that
legal reasoning may “facilitate democratic thinking and outcomes” in a new
Iraq,7 this Article will set out general considerations on the legal front for
when to exclude confessions from criminal prosecutions. While other legal
measures surely will be necessary,8 the drafting of a new constitution9 will
present an opportunity for enshrining in Iraqi law exclusionary rules that will
help protect Iraqis in the interrogation chamber, improve the reliability of
confessions, increase confidence in the process for obtaining them, and
advance the norms of liberal democracy.
In taking advantage of this opportunity, much can be gained by considering
the United States’ own constitutional approaches to regulating interrogations
through the exclusionary rule and adapting the lessons learned to Iraq’s current
concerns and future aspirations. This Article therefore will examine the
constitutional bases relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court to exclude
confessions obtained under interrogation and consider their suitability to a
democratic Iraq. In Part I, as a preliminary matter, this Article will review past
and present Iraqi law regulating interrogations. Then, in Parts II through IV,
this Article will review the constitutional principles governing the
admissibility of confessions developed by the Supreme Court under the Due
Process Clause (Part II), the Sixth Amendment (Part III), and the Fifth
Amendment (Part IV), and consider how well these principles and related Iraqi
law may be adapted to advance the nation’s competing needs for security and
liberty.
I. Iraqi Law
One need look no further than Iraqi law under Saddam’s regime to find
broad and stringent bans on abuses in interrogation. Specifically, Article 22
of the 1990 Interim Constitution of Iraq provides that “[t]he dignity of man is
safeguarded,” and categorically proscribes the infliction of “any physical or
psychological harm.”10 Furthermore, the code of criminal procedure in effect
during Saddam’s reign states that “[t]he use of any illegal method to influence
the accused and extract a confession is not permitted,” and lists as illegal

7. Feldman, supra note 5, at 9.
8. For example, criminal or civil liability for abusive interrogation practices would be
advisable. See infra notes 13-14, 61, 145 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
10. IRAQ INTERIM CONST. art. 22(a) (1990).
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methods “[m]istreatment[s], threats, injury, enticement, promises,
psychological influence or use of drugs or intoxicants.”11
Notably, none of the above provisions require excluding from criminal
prosecutions confessions obtained as a result of their violation. Indeed, the
code of criminal procedure provides without limitation that “statements of the
defendant are [to be] heard” at trial.12 However, the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969
does prescribe imprisonment for “[a]ny public official or agent who tortures
or orders the torture of an accused, witness, or informant to compel him to
confess.”13 What is more, the penal code also punishes by imprisonment
“[a]ny public official or agent who cruelly treats a person in the course of his
duties thereby causing him to suffer a loss of esteem or dignity or physical
pain.”14 While sweeping and severe on paper, these laws lacked enforcement
under the Saddam regime, which made torture an essential tool of
interrogation.15
After the fall of the regime in 2003, the governing Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) led by the United States and the United Kingdom adopted
most of the provisions of the penal and criminal procedure codes, including
those previously discussed.16 The CPA subsequently turned over sovereignty
to a new Iraqi government under the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)
in 2004.17 That law supplemented the above provisions18 to give accused
individuals a number of protections, among them the right “to engage
independent and competent counsel,” “to remain silent in response to
questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any reason,” and
11. LAW ON CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WITH AMENDMENTS, Book Two, ch. 5, § 5, ¶ 127
(1971) [hereinafter LAW ON CRIM. PRO.].
12. Id., Book Three, § 4, ¶ 167.
13. IRAQI PENAL CODE ¶ 333 (1969). This paragraph does not set out any particular range
of imprisonment.
14. Id. ¶ 332. The maximum term of imprisonment set out in this paragraph is one year.
15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
16. See Coalition Provisional Authority [hereinafter CPA], Memorandum No. 3 (Rev.), § 2
(June 27, 2004), at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040627_CPAMEMO_3_
Criminal_Procedures__Rev_.pdf (adopting in substantial part the LAW ON CRIM. PRO., supra
note 11); CPA, Order No. 7, § 2 (June 9, 2003), at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20030610_CPAORD_7_Penal_Code.pdf (adopting in substantial part the IRAQI PENAL CODE,
supra note 13).
17. See generally CPA, Order No. 100 (June 28, 2004), at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040628_CPAORD_100_Transition_of_Laws__Regulations__Orders__and_
Directives.pdf; LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD [hereinafter TAL].
18. See TAL, supra note 17, art. 26 (“Except as otherwise provided in this Law, the laws
in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 [the turnover date] shall remain in effect unless and until
rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Transitional Government in accordance with this Law.”).
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to “be notified of these rights.”19 Furthermore, like prior laws, the TAL
prohibited “[t]orture in all its forms, physical or mental,” as well as “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.”20 Significantly, the TAL provided for the
first time that confessions “made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof”
shall be excluded from “any proceeding, criminal or otherwise.”21
Pursuant to the TAL, Iraqis early in 2005 elected a National Assembly,22
which the TAL charges with responsibility for drafting “a permanent and
legitimate constitution achieving full democracy.”23 The TAL and the prior
laws it extends will stay in effect until the formation of a new government
under the permanent constitution.24 As a result, a hodgepodge of provisions
currently governs interrogation practices and the use of confessions in Iraq,
from the Saddam-era prohibitions against interrogation abuses to the additional
rights and exclusionary remedy under the TAL.25
Because these Iraqi laws have little enforcement history, this Article will
consider their suitability to regulating interrogations in the context of
discussing more practiced constitutional doctrines in the United States. It is
to the first of these doctrines, historically speaking, that this Article now turns.
II. Due Process
As construed by the Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments 26 prohibits the admission of involuntary
confessions.27 Further refined, the clause requires the exclusion of confessions
where “a defendant’s will was overborne” under the totality of circumstances,
considering “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.”28 Among the concerns underlying this prohibition are an
19. Id. art. 15(E).
20. Id. art. 15(J).
21. Id.
22. See id. art. 30; see also Dexter Filkins, The Iraqi Election, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005,
at A1.
23. TAL, supra note 17, pmbl. See generally id. art. 60-61.
24. Id. art. 62.
25. In addition, the rules of procedure being developed for the Iraqi Special Tribunal for
the prosecution of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes apparently will
require exclusion of “any evidence” resulting from torture. See Morning Edition (NPR radio
broadcast, Dec. 12, 2004) (interview statement of Michael Scharf).
26. Both the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal government, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, applicable to the states, provide that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
27. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
28. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). Put
another way, this fact-specific test requires determining whether, considering the circumstances,
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evidentiary one with the “inherent untrustworthiness” of coerced confessions29
and a normative one with methods of interrogation “revolting to the sense of
justice.”30
As applied by the Supreme Court, the due process test has been fairly
effective at identifying and excluding confessions obtained by physical
coercion from actual or threatened brutality31 or from basic physical
deprivations.32 The test has been less successful, however, at delineating the
difference between permissible and overbearing pressures in more subtle
physical or psychological forms. For example, while circumstances such as
the length and time of interrogation,33 the use of false sympathy or fabricated
evidence,34 implied promises of leniency or harshness,35 and the age,
the government deprived a confessing suspect of his “power of resistance.” Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
29. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
30. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286. The normative concern encompasses “a complex of values”
beyond “the likelihood that the confession is untrue [or] the preservation of the individual's
freedom of will.” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). “It also turns on the deeprooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.” Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21. The Court has
even gone so far as to say that involuntary confessions must be excluded
[n]ot because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods
used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our
criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system — a
system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and
freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of
his own mouth.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
31. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 283 (1991) (excluding confession from
defendant subjected to credible threat of physical harm at hands of other inmates); Brown, 297
U.S. at 281-82 (excluding confession from defendant subjected to actual hanging and
whipping).
32. See, e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 413-14 (1967) (excluding confession from
defendant subjected to denial of clothing and food).
33. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 752 (1966) (excluding confessions
from defendant subjected to repeated interrogation in “coercive atmosphere” over sixteen days);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1944) (excluding confession from defendant
subjected to interrogation for thirty-six hours “without respite”).
34. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1969) (holding that use of fabricated
confession of another “is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this otherwise
voluntary confession inadmissible”); Spano, 360 U.S. at 323 (concluding that defendant’s “will
was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused” from emotionally
manipulative interrogation by childhood friend).
35. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1963) (excluding confession
obtained from defendant inexperienced in criminal law “after the police had told her that state
financial aid for her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken from her, if she did
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education, intelligence, and other characteristics of the suspect,36 have all
factored into the voluntariness inquiry, none have proved dispositive.37 Indeed
none can be, given the due process test’s requirement that “the totality of all
the surrounding circumstances” be considered.38 Moreover, the metaphysical
inquiry into the state of a person’s “will,” while confounding enough as a
philosophical matter,39 may be impossible to discover as a matter of historical
fact. These difficulties have left interrogators in the field without much
practical guidance.40 Furthermore, courts reviewing interrogations ultimately
must resort to an implicit, if not express, balancing between society’s need for
security and competing norms of justice, fairness, and liberty.41
In light of these considerations, application of the due process
involuntariness standard in Iraq would have certain pluses and minuses. On
the plus side, the standard should suffice to exclude confessions obtained by
the kind of physical and extreme psychological abuse that was the hallmark of
interrogations under the old regime and that continues under the new
governing authorities.42
Less obviously, but perhaps as importantly,
incorporating the standard into the new Iraqi constitution would help to
promote respect for the individual in the emerging democracy. At the same
time, the standard has enough flexibility to provide some accommodation to
Iraq’s pressing need for security, and to grow more protective as the security
situation improves.43
not ‘cooperate,’” but that officers would recommend “leniency” if she did).
36. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 438 (1958) (considering “petitioner's
age, intelligence, and education,” including his law school training in criminal law, in
determining whether confession was coerced).
37. For more cases considering these and other factors, see Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure, GEO. L.J. 172-76 (2004).
38. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
39. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Werner S. Plunar trans.,
2002) (1788).
40. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (“The line between proper and
permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a
difficult one to draw.”).
41. However, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court asserted that
its due process cases “reflect a frank recognition that the Constitution requires the sacrifice of
neither security nor liberty.” Id. at 225. The concept of “voluntariness,” according to the Court,
accommodates both “the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective
enforcement of criminal laws,” and “society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be
used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police
tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.” Id. at 224-25.
42. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
43. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the “evolving conscience of the American people would add new ‘intermediate premises’” to
due process protections).
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On the minus side, the fact-specific and metaphysical nature of the
involuntariness standard may lend itself even less to sorting out distinctions in
Iraq between those more subtle interrogation tactics that are coercive and those
that are permissible. Indeed, the somewhat “amphibian”44 standard may
encourage rather than discourage interrogators from engaging in more
questionable methods of inquiry.
Outside the scope of the clearly
impermissible, the de facto discretion provided to interrogators by the
involuntariness standard may be problematic enough in the United States.45
Those problems would be exacerbated in a country wracked daily by terrorist
attacks.
Given these potential problems, Iraq’s adoption of a more specific standard
may be desirable. Such standards may be found in both U.S. and Iraqi law.
For example, to borrow from another constitutional provision, the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination, as once construed by the
Supreme Court,46 prohibits the use of confessions “extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.”47 Additionally, as
noted, the 1990 Interim Constitution of Iraq bans the infliction of “any
physical or psychological harm”;48 the code of criminal procedure prohibits the
extraction of confessions by “[m]istreatment[s], threats, injury, enticement,
promises, psychological influence or use of drugs or intoxicants”;49 the Iraqi
Penal Code of 1969 criminalizes torture and cruel treatment by public
officials;50 and the TAL not only bans “[t]orture in all its forms, physical or
mental,” but also prohibits the admission of any confession “made under
compulsion, torture, or threat thereof” in any proceeding.51
These standards reflect some of the same liberal norms as the due process
standard.52 They seek to safeguard “the dignity of man”53 from “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment.”54 They also generally provide greater
protection. For instance, the proscription of “any physical or psychological
44. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 605 (1961).
45. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004) (plurality op.) (“[T]he traditional
totality-of-the-circumstances test posed an unacceptably great risk that involuntary custodial
confessions would escape detection.”) (internal quotations omitted).
46. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
47. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (internal quotations omitted).
48. IRAQ INTERIM CONST. art. 22(a) (1990).
49. LAW ON CRIM. PRO., supra note 11, Book Two, ch. 5, § 5, ¶ 127.
50. IRAQI PENAL CODE ¶¶ 332, 333 (1969).
51. TAL, supra note 17, art. 15(J).
52. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. IRAQI INTERIM CONST. art. 22(a).
54. TAL, supra note 17, art. 15(J).
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harm,”55 taken literally, prohibits all bodily or mental injury; the prohibition
of the use of “any . . . psychological influence,”56 taken literally, is even
broader; and the ban on “any improper influence,”57 depending on the
construction of “improper,” may be the broadest possible proscription. By
contrast, the due process inquiry treats nonphysical influences and injuries as
nondispositive considerations under the totality of circumstances.58
The relative specificity of these alternative standards recommends them
over the due process involuntariness test. Under a new government, in
particular, state interrogators and individuals subject to interrogation would
benefit from clearer rules at the outset regarding the permissible bounds of
official questioning. However, the reach of the broader of these standards may
make all but the most innocuous methods of interrogation illegal, and deprive
the state of the ability to employ subtle but effective psychological ploys to
obtain confessions.
In the end, a standard or set of standards that strikes a balance between
clarity and flexibility may work best. In this regard, the TAL’s provisions
merit serious consideration. The TAL’s prohibition of actual or threatened
torture in all forms, physical and mental, is more specific than the due process
standard but less sweeping than bans on all psychological harms or influences.
Additionally, the TAL’s prohibition of compelled confessions may provide
fallback protection similar to that of the involuntariness test against coercive
police conduct not rising to the level of torture. Combined, these two
provisions would give the Iraqi government some room in which to operate
and some guidance with respect to clearly prohibited conduct. At the same
time, they would protect individuals against more or less obvious interrogation
abuses.
Of course, however bright or broad, proscriptions of interrogation abuses
mean nothing without effective enforcement mechanisms or a government
willing to enforce them. Indeed, the Iraqi experience to date amply illustrates
the potential gulf between laws on paper and actual practice.59 Nevertheless,
the drafters of the new Iraqi constitution must proceed on the assumption that
a new regime eventually will abide by the dictates of that document.
If the drafters choose to incorporate any of the above interrogation standards
into the constitution, they should consider including a command of exclusion60
55. IRAQ INTERIM CONST. art. 22(a) (emphasis added).
56. LAW ON CRIM PRO., supra note 11, Book Two, ch. 5, § 5, ¶ 127 (emphasis added).
57. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (internal quotations omitted).
58. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 1-3.
60. As noted, such a command is noticeably absent from the comprehensive Saddam-era
prohibitions, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, but present in the TAL, see supra note

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss1/4

2005]

CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCLUDED CONFESSIONS

45

with it as a means of deterring violations.61 For the same reason, they should
also consider whether to require the exclusion of evidence derived from
involuntary confessions — including subsequent confessions, witness
testimony, and physical evidence — to prevent the state from exploiting its
illegality and to deter further violations.62
III. Sixth Amendment
The second constitutional provision under which the U.S. Supreme Court
has excluded confessions is the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to
“the Assistance of Counsel” in “all criminal prosecutions.”63 According to the

21 and accompanying text, as well as the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Patane, 124
S. Ct. 2620, 2628 (2004) (plurality op.) (“[T]he Self-Incrimination Clause contains its own
exclusionary rule. It provides that ‘[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). Furthermore, the due process
standard implicitly requires exclusion, as it is violated not only when a confession is obtained
by coercive methods, but also when the government uses a confession so obtained to “prove its
charge against an accused out of his own mouth.” Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541
(1961); see Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 907 (1989). Nevertheless, if the drafters choose to adopt a due process standard, they
would do well to expressly exclude such confessions rather than leave their admissibility open
to the vagaries of how the standard will be construed.
61. Among the purposes served by “excluding evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution.” Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986). Of course, there may be other means of deterring
violations, such as criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions. See supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text; cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1994) (arguing that strict governmental liability and punitive damages rather than
exclusion best deters future violations). Considerations underlying such sanctions and their
desirability for Iraq are beyond the intended scope of this article.
62. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding that exclusion of
evidence as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” of illegal police action turns on whether such
evidence “has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint”) (internal quotations omitted); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (“The essence of a provision forbidding
the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”). The Supreme Court has yet to hold
expressly that the “fruit of the poisonous tree” principle applies to due process violations. Cf.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (refusing to hold voluntary confession in violation
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), “so taints the investigatory process that a
subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period”).
63. In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
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Supreme Court, this right arises after the initiation of judicial proceedings,64
and requires exclusion of statements “deliberately elicited” by the government
from the accused absent counsel or a valid waiver of counsel.65 Such
deliberate elicitation may occur directly through interrogation,66 or indirectly
through the creation of situations calculated to produce incriminating
information.67 While the underpinnings of this doctrine have been criticized
as less than clear,68 the doctrine appears to be motivated by a systemic concern
with maintaining an adversarial process and a normative concern with ensuring
the fairness of that process through interposing counsel between the suspect
and the state.69
In the United States, the Sixth Amendment has not played a major role in
regulating interrogations. Doctrinally speaking, because the right to counsel
does not attach until the initiation of judicial proceedings,70 it does not
necessarily extend its protections to the interrogation room. And practically
speaking, most interrogations occur shortly after arrest but before the
attachment of the right. Thus, unlike due process, the Sixth Amendment’s
ability to regulate confessions is limited by its applicability. Moreover,
historically speaking, the Supreme Court’s use of the Sixth Amendment as a
check on state interrogation methods began in 1964 with Massiah v. United
States,71 but was shortly supplanted and largely overshadowed by the Court’s
landmark decision two years later in Miranda v. Arizona.72 As discussed
64. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). Judicial proceedings may be initiated
for Sixth Amendment purposes “‘by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.’” Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
65. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206, 207 (1964). To prove waiver, the state
must show “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (internal quotations omitted).
66. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Massiah, 377 U.S. 201.
68. See, e.g., Henry, 447 U.S. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (“Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’
between him and the State.”); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204 (deliberately eliciting statements from
a defendant without the protection of counsel “might deny [him] effective representation by
counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him”) (internal quotations
omitted).
70. The Court extended the right to counsel early on in its doctrinal life to a case where a
suspect under interrogation was the “focus” of police investigation. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at
490. However, the Court never again has recognized the right before the beginning of formal
adversarial proceedings, but rather has limited Escobedo to its facts. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
71. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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below,73 the latter decision shifted the constitutional focus to the Fifth
Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah has no analogue in
Iraqi law,74 and several considerations weigh against the adoption of such a
right to reform interrogation practices in Iraq. Foremost, while no doubt
clearer than the due process involuntariness standard, the right’s accidental
reach into the interrogation room would make it underinclusive as a regulatory
tool. Of course, the drafters of the new Iraqi constitution could choose to
extend the right to counsel to all interrogations regardless of whether a
criminal prosecution has commenced. However, decisions regarding whether,
when, and to what extent to guarantee a right to counsel implicate
considerations other than interrogation reform. For example, what role, if any,
should counsel play in the criminal process, and what resources, if any, should
the country devote to the provision of counsel? As these basic questions
suggest, Iraqi choices regarding the nature of the criminal process and the role
of counsel in that process will determine in large part the existence and shape
of any right to counsel in Iraq.75
In short, the right to counsel derives from systemic considerations that are
broader than concerns about interrogation. While the right may be adapted to
address those concerns, as the Supreme Court has done, they are not the right’s
raison d’être, and the fit is hardly perfect. To address interrogation abuses
head on, a more direct approach may work better.
IV. Fifth Amendment
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court took one such direct approach.
Responding to the underinclusiveness of the Sixth Amendment as an
interrogation-policing doctrine;76 the “unacceptably great” risk that the due
73. See infra Part IV.
74. Although the TAL secures “the right to engage independent and competent counsel,”
TAL, supra note 17, art. 15(E), the TAL gives no indication that this right to procure counsel
extends to the interrogation setting, much less that it protects against the deliberate elicitation
of confessions without counsel after judicial proceedings have begun. See infra notes 133-34
and accompanying text.
75. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries,
but it is in ours.”); Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
1 (1964) (describing counsel’s role as essential in a “due process” model of the criminal process
but negligible in a “crime control” model).
76. Evincing this concern, the Supreme Court in Miranda recast its prior foray into
regulating interrogations under the Sixth Amendment in Fifth Amendment terms: “The denial
of the defendant’s request for his attorney [in Escobedo] thus undermined his ability to exercise
the privilege — to remain silent if he chose or to speak without any intimidation, blatant or
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process involuntariness standard may not catch less blatant forms of coercive
interrogation;77 the historical shift from physical to psychological techniques
to extract confessions;78 an assumption that these modern methods “trade[] on
the weakness of individuals” and make the setting for interrogation “inherently
compelling”;79 and a desire to preserve the “adversary” and “accusatory”
system of criminal justice as well as “the dignity and integrity” of the person,80
the Court required the now-famous “procedural safeguards” to “secure the
privilege against self-incrimination” of the Fifth Amendment.81 Before
custodial interrogation, the suspect must be informed that he has a right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, that he has a
right to have an attorney before and during questioning, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be provided.82 Absent proper warnings or a valid
waiver of the rights therein, any statement from the suspect is deemed coerced
by the “inherently compelling pressures” of the interrogation environment83
and therefore inadmissible at trial.84 However, after such warnings “to combat
these pressures”85 and a valid waiver,86 a confession will be constitutionally
admissible unless it is “involuntary.”87 If involuntary, the confession would
violate due process as well as the actual privilege against self-incrimination,
which the Court has construed to provide “parallel” protection.88
subtle.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
77. Id. at 442.
78. See id. at 445-55.
79. Id. at 455, 467.
80. Id. at 460.
81. Id. at 444. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: “No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 473.
83. Id. at 467.
84. Id. at 476.
85. Id. at 467.
86. In Miranda, the Court stated that “a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel,” and warned that “a valid waiver
will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply
from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Id. at 475. However, in North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), the Court observed that “the defendant’s silence,
coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may . . .
support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights.” Id. at 373.
87. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 444 (2000).
88. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2607 (2004) (plurality op.); see also Dickerson,
530 U.S. at 433 (“Over time, our cases recognized two constitutional bases for the requirement
that a confession be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). This was not
always the case, as the Fifth Amendment standard was once clearer and more protective:

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss1/4

2005]

CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCLUDED CONFESSIONS

49

As the Supreme Court recently has observed, “Miranda has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have
become part of our national culture.”89 Notwithstanding its iconic status,
Miranda has attracted a fair amount of criticism from its inception to the
present. Among these criticisms are attacks on the validity of Miranda’s
requirements and rights on the grounds that they are not “compelled [or] even
strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment,” are “at odds
with American and English legal history” regarding the privilege,90 and do not
reflect actual, less coercive, police practices.91 Additionally, some have
accused Miranda of hindering good police investigation and, as a result,
costing society too many confessions and convictions.92 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent cases construing Miranda narrowly93 and limiting
its exclusionary rule94 can be criticized as an extended campaign to undermine
[A] confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, must
not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence
. . . . A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been
influenced by any threat or promise . . . .
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (internal quotations omitted).
89. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting); see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]ny conclusion that a violation of the Miranda rules necessarily
amounts to a violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination can claim no
support in history, precedent, or common sense.”); Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege
in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996).
91. See Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
92. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998).
But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500 (1996); George C. Thomas, III, Plain Talk About the
Miranda Empirical Debate: A ‘Steady-State’ Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933
(1996).
93. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that interrogation by
undercover officer is not interrogation requiring Miranda warnings); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (holding that Miranda requirements are inapplicable where “police
officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety”); California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 360 (1981) (opining that Miranda only requires an “equivalent”
rather than “talismanic incantation” of its warnings) (internal quotations omitted); North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (noting that Miranda waivers may be implied from
“course of conduct”).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (plurality op.) (holding that
physical “fruit” of Miranda violation is admissible); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985)
(holding that warned confession that is “fruit” of prior unwarned but uncoerced confession is
admissible); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that witness testimony that is
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the underpinnings and effectiveness of the decision.95 The Court’s postMiranda cases have also drawn fire for characterizing Miranda’s requirements
as either “prophylactic”96 or “constitutional”97 in nature — or remarkably, even
both at the same time98 — when such characterizations have suited the result.99
Finally, for a decision that purported to give “concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts,”100 Miranda can be
faulted for generating an entire body of (not entirely consistent) case law
defining basic terms and deciding basic questions, often decades later.101
Despite these criticisms, or perhaps in light of them, considered application
of Miranda’s core rules in Iraq now may realize greater advantages than in the
United States, and at the same time may avoid some of the criticisms leveled
against Miranda. Foremost, adoption of Miranda’s rights to silence and
counsel and its requirements to warn would rehabilitate interrogation practices
and perceptions in several significant respects. First, from a practical
standpoint, Iraqis may be unfamiliar with their rights under the new regime,
“fruit” of Miranda violation is admissible); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing
statements obtained in violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment).
95. Indeed, casting these decisions in a positive light, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
Court in Dickerson that “our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on
legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision's core ruling that unwarned
statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.” Dickerson, 530 U.S.
at 443-44.
96. See, e.g., Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654 (Rehnquist, J.) (“The prophylactic Miranda
warnings therefore are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.’”)
(quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444).
97. See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432 (“We hold that Miranda [is] a constitutional
decision of this Court.”). The author of this statement, Chief Justice Rehnquist, also authored
the contrary statement in Quarles. See supra note 96.
98. See, e.g., Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2629-30 (characterizing Miranda as “a constitutional
rule” and a “prophylactic rule,” in the same paragraph no less).
99. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 89 n.212 (2000); Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s
Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 901-04 (2001).
100. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
101. See, e.g., Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (deciding the admissibility of physical fruits of
Miranda violations thirty-eight years after Miranda); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291
(1980) (defining “interrogation” fourteen years after Miranda); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at
545 (“Today’s decision leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody,
whether his statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation, whether the accused
has effectively waived his rights, and whether nontestimonial evidence introduced at trial is the
fruit of statements made during a prohibited interrogation, all of which are certain to prove
productive of uncertainty during investigation and litigation during prosecution.”) (White, J.,
prophetically dissenting).
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and what better time to inform or remind them of their rights under
interrogation than before questioning. Second, placing the power to forego
questioning squarely in the hands of the suspect rather than the questioner
would reverse the paradigm of absolute state power and individual
powerlessness that has dominated Iraq. That paradigm shift would help
“overcom[e] the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere.”102
However arguable those pressures may be in the United States, surely they
cannot be gainsaid in Iraq, where past and present practices of torture cannot
be far from the minds of those subject to interrogation. Although such
pressures still may make invoking the right to silence or counsel difficult,103
the warnings at least would underscore to suspects an option not previously
available. Furthermore, compliance with Miranda’s core protections by law
enforcement would eventually engender confidence in their reality. Third,
such compliance in Iraq would increase the reliability of confessions,104
improve public perception of interrogation, and propagate Miranda’s
underlying norms of individual dignity and integrity, especially if these
protections end up so “embedded in routine police practice” as to become part
of the “national culture.”105
To be sure, the potential advantages that stem from adopting Miranda’s
core rules should be weighed against the social costs of reliable confessions,
resulting convictions, and investigatory leads that may be lost as a result of the
very success of the adoption.106 After all, unlike in the United States, where
the Supreme Court has construed the Miranda rules to be constitutionally
required to secure the Fifth Amendment privilege,107 the drafters of the Iraqi
constitution must consider in the first instance whether to afford any
protections against self-incrimination in the interrogation setting. However,
102. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
103. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Y ALE L. J. 2137, 2187
(2002) (“Invocation is both an act of power by which the suspect takes control of his
conversation with the police, and an act of rational self-interest by which he avoids talking his
way into a prison cell. Frightened suspects in police interrogation rooms are not likely to feel
powerful.”).
104. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (noting that “cases in which
a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’
despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are
rare”).
105. Id. at 443.
106. Costs from lost investigatory leads may be high even from the loss of a single
confession if, for example, it would have revealed the location of a car bomb. Of course,
compliance with Miranda does not necessarily result in the loss of a confession, as a suspect
may waive his right to confess, as often occurs in the United States. See infra notes 115-17 and
accompanying text.
107. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
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Miranda’s potential costs should not counsel against its adoption, as those
costs may be mitigated in a number of ways.
Miranda’s right to counsel may provide one source of mitigation. At the
outset, it should be noted that, unlike the Sixth Amendment, this right to
counsel does not require the state to provide a suspect with an attorney.
Rather, it simply prohibits the police from questioning if counsel is requested
but not provided.108 Thus, the Miranda right to counsel is tailored to the
interrogation process and does not depend on broader systemic considerations
that make the Sixth Amendment guarantee less suitable.109 In addition, the
presence of counsel, if requested and provided, may not hinder the
investigation. Counsel may find it in the client’s best interest to cooperate,
and, in fact, one prominent study in the United States found that lawyers
usually advised suspects to do so.110 If the same holds true in Iraq, then an
additional advantage of Miranda’s right to counsel would be the legitimacy
that counsel would add to the interrogation process and any confession that
results.111 Therefore, the right to counsel may cost society less than perhaps
originally thought.
The warnings themselves may not prove as costly either if, along with the
core Miranda rules, Iraq also adopts a public safety exception similar to that
articulated by the Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles.112 In that case, the
Court held that police do not have to give Miranda warnings if there is an
“objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any
immediate danger”113 and questioning is “reasonably prompted by a concern
for the public safety.”114 An exception like this may strike an acceptable
balance between security and liberty in Iraq. It would allow authorities to
question a suspect who may know the whereabouts of a car bomb or an
attacker in the vicinity without the potential hindrance of warnings, while
preserving a suspect’s rights in less pressing interrogation scenarios. To be
sure, there is a risk that such an exception may swallow the rule requiring
108. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
109. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
110. See generally Wald, supra note 91.
111. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470 (“With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will
practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to
it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully
accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at
trial.”).
112. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
113. Id. at 659 n.8.
114. Id. at 656. Under those circumstances, according to the Court, “the need for answers
to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege.” Id. at 657.
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warnings in a volatile nation like Iraq. However, if limited to truly exigent
circumstances of immediate danger to the public, the applicability of the
exception should diminish as Iraq’s security situation improves. In that way,
the exception would give the Miranda rules some practical flexibility to
protect suspects without unduly compromising the safety of the public, and to
expand its protections as the country stabilizes.
In any event, regardless of whether Iraq recognizes a public safety
exception of some sort, the administration of warnings may not deter a great
number of confessions. In the United States, an empirical debate over the
effect Miranda warnings have had on the production of confessions has
remained unresolved.115 But what is fairly clear from major studies is that
suspects very frequently waive their rights and confess.116 Consequently, the
administration of warnings in Iraq may not have a substantial chilling effect
on confessions.117 On the other hand, as argued above, warnings could
improve the reliability of confessions and perhaps more importantly the
practice of interrogation.118
Another way to mitigate the social costs of implementing Miranda’s core
rules in Iraq would be to limit their exclusionary reach. In the United States,
over the course of four decades, the Supreme Court has done just that. While
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda itself are still inadmissible,119 the
Court has held admissible physical evidence120 and witness testimony121
discovered as a result of such a violation. Additionally, in most circumstances,
warned statements that may be the “fruit” of an unwarned confession are also
admissible.122 In deciding whether to adopt any or all of these limitations, the
115. See supra note 92.
116. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 859-60 (1996); Richard A.
Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653-54 (1996); see
also Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1466 (1985).
117. It bears mention, however, that the high waiver rate (as much as nearly 80%, see Leo,
supra note 116, at 653), has been criticized for being “distributively unattractive — welleducated suspects and recidivists tend to gain at the expense of suspects with less education and
less criminal experience.” Stuntz, supra note 103, at 2188.
118. See supra notes 104-05, 110-11 and accompanying text.
119. Such confessions may, however, now be used for impeachment purposes. See Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
120. United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2626 (2004) (plurality op.).
121. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-52 (1974).
122. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (“[A] simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to
undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will [does not] so taint[] the investigatory
process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate
period.”); cf. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2616 (2004) (plurality op.) (Kennedy, J.,
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drafters of the Iraqi constitution would need to weigh the deterrence value of
downstream exclusion against the loss of often reliable evidence.123
Finally, cost considerations aside, constitutional adoption of Miranda-like
rules in Iraq would avoid the legitimacy and clarity problems that have
plagued the decision since its inception.124 Obviously, writing the rules into
the Iraqi constitution would avoid Miranda’s difficulties with substantiating
its requirements as constitutionally mandated125 — difficulties that over
decades have made Miranda vulnerable to judicial limitations and exceptions
that have left it pockmarked.126 Furthermore, including in the constitution any
limitations, exceptions, and clarifications127 developed by the Supreme Court
or contemplated by the drafters would insulate the adopted rules, in proportion
to their clarity and comprehensiveness, from subsequent judicial or legislative
attack.128
Of course, “it is a constitution” that the Iraqis will be drafting.129 While
more specificity may help protect constitutional provisions from politically or
ideologically convenient constructions, it would also limit their flexibility and
consequently their adaptability in the long run.130 As a compromise, the
drafters could constitutionalize the core Miranda protections and codify any
specific exceptions, exclusionary limitations, or other clarifications to make
them easier to amend, for better or worse.
An example of a quasi-constitutional adoption of Miranda-like rules for the
drafters to consider may be found in the currently governing law in Iraq, the
TAL. As previously noted, the TAL provides that an accused “has the right
to engage independent and competent counsel [and] to remain silent in
concurring in judgment) (noting that if initial Miranda violation is part of “deliberate two-step
strategy” to question first and warn later, “postwarning statements that are related to the
substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative measures are taken before
the postwarning statement is made”).
123. See Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (observing that
“fruits analysis would examine . . . the balance of deterrence value versus the drastic and
socially costly course of excluding reliable evidence”) (internal quotations omitted); Elstad, 470
U.S. at 308 (reasoning that testimonial fruits of Miranda violations should be admitted where
“neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth Amendment goal
of assuring trustworthy evidence would be served”).
124. See supra notes 90, 101 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 93, 94, 112-14, 119-22 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (declaring
unconstitutional Congress’s statutory attempt to make involuntariness rather than Miranda the
test for admitting confessions in federal court).
129. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
130. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST.
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response to questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any
reason.”131 The TAL also requires that a suspect “be notified of these rights”
at the time of arrest.132
As the current charter of government in Iraq, the TAL provides useful
precedent for the constitutional adoption of Miranda-like rules, but the value
of its provisions lies more in their illustration of ambiguities that the drafters
of the constitution should avoid. What appears clear from the TAL is that
counsel is guaranteed only for those who can afford to “engage” an attorney.
However, it is entirely unclear whether the right to such counsel as one may
procure extends to the interrogation setting. Equally unclear is whether the
right to silence is limited to not being compelled “to testify” in the formal
sense at trial, or whether it also extends to pretrial interrogations, where
confessions typically are obtained. And while the exclusionary provision of
the TAL, prohibiting without limitation the admission of confessions made
“under compulsion,”133 suggests that the right to silence extends to
interrogations, that provision leaves unanswered whether confessions obtained
under interrogation without (engaged or requested) counsel would be excluded
as well.134 Given these textual shortcomings, the TAL’s provisions would not
serve as a particularly good model for constitution or code drafting in Iraq.
Regardless of whether the drafters of the Iraqi constitution choose to adopt
the Miranda rules in their entirety as developed in the United States, in light
of the above considerations, they at least should make their choices clear.
Doing so would provide what was long missing in the United States: actual
“concrete constitutional guidelines” for law enforcement to conduct
interrogations and for courts to police them.135
V. Conclusion
Torture as a past and present tool of interrogation in Iraq threatens to
undermine the country’s emergence as a liberal democracy. In confronting the
substantial task of reforming interrogation practices and their public
perception, Iraqis may draw valuable lessons from the United States’
experience with the constitutional regulation of the admissibility of
confessions in criminal cases. As this Article argues,136 writing Miranda-like
rules into the Iraqi constitution would go far in alleviating the especially
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

TAL, supra note 17, art. 15(E).
Id.
Id. art. 15(J).
See id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
See generally supra Part IV.
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coercive environment of custodial interrogation in Iraq and restoring public
confidence in the interrogation process. Adopting the core Miranda rights to
silence and counsel as well as its requirements to warn would help Iraqis
become aware of their rights under the new regime and shift control of the
interrogation process from the state to the individual. Adapting Miranda’s
public safety exception and exclusionary reach to accommodate the security
situation in Iraq would help to strike a viable balance between freedom from
private violence and freedom from the state.137
To be sure, the most well-considered rules in the world would mean nothing
if not enforced, as Iraq’s own past and present experiences exemplify.138
However, if the United States’ experience with Miranda repeats itself in Iraq,
then a low rate of lost confessions and the legitimizing impact of compliance
may encourage eventual acceptance of Miranda-like rules by Iraqi law
enforcement.139 Even if widespread compliance comes later rather than
sooner, writing Miranda-like rules into the Iraqi constitution at least would
supply, for more receptive times, the legal framework for protecting the
integrity and dignity of individuals under interrogation.
This is not to say that adoption and adaption of Miranda to Iraq would
provide a panacea for its interrogation woes. Far from it. For one, police still
may coerce suspects into confessing after a waiver of rights.140 Miranda only
regulates interrogation procedures, not techniques. For the latter, Iraq would
need to adopt and enforce a substantive standard, such as involuntariness under
the Due Process Clause or past Iraqi prohibitions of torture or other methods
of compulsion.141 Additionally, excluding confessions in criminal cases only
indirectly regulates the methods of their extraction, and is effective only to the
extent that exclusion deters.142 Obviously, it would not affect those who
engage in torture solely for the sake of pleasure or intelligence.143 As noted
137. Cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 539 (White, J., dissenting) (“Without the reasonably effective
performance of the task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about
human dignity and civilized values.”).
138. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Cf. T.S. Eliot, THE HOLLOW MEN, pt. V, ln.
5-6, 9 (“Between the idea/And the reality . . . Falls the shadow”).
139. See Stuntz, supra note 103, at 2188 (describing “the general police satisfaction with
Miranda”); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (observing that
“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice”).
140. But see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 (“Cases in which a defendant can make a colorable
argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.”).
141. See generally supra Part II.
142. Furthermore, as Herbert Packer has observed, judicial exclusion of evidence only
results in piecemeal enforcement of constitutional standards. See Packer, supra note 75, at 30
(noting that exclusion “is still only a retail operation, and the problem is a wholesale one”).
143. See, e.g., Kate Zernike, Detainees Depict Abuses by Guard in Prison in Iraq, N.Y.
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earlier, reform of interrogation practices and perception in Iraq will require a
panoply of responses.144 For example, criminal proscriptions against torture
such as those in the Iraqi Penal Code145 would help deter and punish those who
torture to obtain confessions for purposes other than prosecution. Regardless,
the drafting of a new Iraqi constitution will present a historic opportunity for
enshrining exclusionary principles that not only will ensure fairer trials based
upon more reliable evidence, but surely will assist the new democracy in
affirming and advancing human dignity and liberty. That opportunity should
not be missed.

T IMES, Jan. 12, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Army Reserve Specialist Charles A. Graner Jr.,
accused by government in court martial of being “a ruthless abuser who took delight in beating
prisoners [at Abu Ghraib] and forcing them into sexually humiliating positions,” unsuccessfully
defended himself on grounds that “soldiers were following orders from military superiors who
were under pressure to obtain better intelligence from the detainees”).
144. See supra Introduction; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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